It is clear that the relative lifting of the uncertainty of the previous period, to which the completion of the first evaluation and the stabilisation of the political climate contributed, was not enough for the recovery of the Greek economy. So, despite those figures that show that the Greek economy has now entered a stabilisation phase (slow de-escalating of high unemployment rates, improving in the conditions of foreign trade, relative stabilisation in the figures of public finances), it is not yet possible to speak about recovery of the Greek economy but rather stagnation.
The new package of recessionary measures that is in full implementation has intensified the lack of rhythm of the Greek economy, which continues eroding the business climate. Seen through these eyes, we could speak about a peculiar negative multiplier with regard to growth for Greek enterprises. In particular, one enterprise that shows signs of improvement and soundness corresponds to some 10 enterprises which are seriously ill, with an undetermined time for healing the wounds left by the six-year recession and fruitless austerity. More and more micro enterprises are in an emergency situation with a tendency exiting the market and extremely reduced tenacity, which widens the competition gap between their larger counterparts.
It seems, then, that a new economic dualism in the real economy tends to get consolidated, which will likely cause intense competition pressures on small enterprises, will strengthen part-time employment and will lead to broadened figures of informal forms of employment and professional activity. This transformation process has made its presence felt since the summer of 2015, when the effects of the second phase of recession tended to mainly hit small entrepreneurship, leading enterprises, which showed signs of tenacity during the first phase of the recession (2010-2014) to go beyond the limits of survival and not to be able to cope with the new wave of austerity. Meanwhile, a second version of dualism developed between enterprises which were created during the crisis and adjusted their economic values in a difficult time keeping low expectations for the future, and those enterprises that came before the crisis, which now face severe problems of survival and adjustment to the new environment.
Painful and frontloaded measures attached to the Third Adjustment Programme lead to a new cycle of self-sustained stagnation and lack of perspective, as they act as a brake on the inherent tendency of entrepreneurship to seek new investment opportunities and profitable markets. Macroeconomic performance remains anemic. Unfortunately, such a closing up of productive forces capable of autonomously reversing the vicious circle of stagnation isnot in sight. IME GSEVEE estimates that the economy is in a phase of the economic cycle where decreased liquidity, the investment gap and low financing capacity, coexist with an exogenously induced negative macroeconomic environment. At the same time, private funding remains insufficient and suitable up-to-date financial instruments are absent, while the possibilities of triggering off investment shock through public investments are limited.
It is essentially about a variation of the "liquidity trap" situation in which any interference with the part of monetary policy (interest rates, values, quantitative easing) is not capable of creating recovery conditions. This phenomenon combines spreading of flexible forms of employment, annihilation of investments (not planned even for depreciation / replacement costs), limited access to capital (regardless of the amount of deposits) and the inability of meeting the enterprises’ operating conditions at the microeconomic level (failure to pay off liabilities, delays in paying wages etc.).
It is obvious that in the current environment any discussion referring to the further reduction of resources (both public and private) and further flexibility in the labour market will lead to further uncertainty and instability since there are no more ways and the room for searching for alternative cost-saving methods.
IME GSEVEE estimates that institutional and quantitative support tools for investment, such as the Development Law and Public Procurement, should be mobilized, that a full use of the available European funds with programmes adapted to the Greek economy should be made, that a framework to strengthen social cohesion (improved employment and small business support programmes, with a restoration of collective bargaining, and coverage of vulnerable groups against poverty risks) should be provided, that the qualitative routes for making use of the comparative advantages that unveiled in the economic environment (tourism, agri-farm group, green energy) should be expanded. The growth planning for Greece of 2020 and the celebrated production reconstruction should not be turned into a privileged area exclusively benefiting certain specific-interest groups. The deregulation of labour markets, products and services is not a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for improving the investment performance of the country, nor for attracting foreign direct investment. The extension of the prosperity share and the equal participation in economic life is a precondition for overcoming the crisis.
At the same time, definitive solutions must be provided to enterprises that have accumulated significant debts, towards both the public sector and the banks. Exposure of households and enterprises to non-performing loans now reaches 45%. Up to now, the environment concerning the profile and capabilities of borrowers has not been clarified. The implementation of the Code of Conduct for banks for non-performing loans must be matched with debts of individuals towards the public sector and must be aimed at a relief of the powerless and a limit to habitual bad payers. The condition of being taken hostage by debts must give way to a second chance, with substantial support for those who wish to get back in business once more.
IME GSEVEE Surveys 
